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United States v. Stevens at 10:
Adding a “Prurient Intent” Element to Resolve
Constitutional Overbreadth in the Federal
Anti-Animal Cruelty Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 48
DALE RADFORD1
Abstract
Ten years ago, in United States v. Stevens, the United States Supreme
Court overturned the federal anti-animal cruelty statute 18 U.S.C. § 48 for
the first time. The statute was specifically drafted to target the clandestine
underground production of so-called “crush videos,” adult entertainment
videos depicting animals being purposefully tortured to death by scantily
clad women.
The Court overturned the statute for potentially criminalizing portrayals
of legal activity with redeeming socio-cultural value, such as hunting. While
the Court relied heavily on analyzing speech as it relates to child
pornography, it did not address whether depictions of animal torture
constitute “obscenity” outside the protection of the First Amendment. Even
after the statute was narrowed in 2010 following the Stevens decision, it was
again criticized in 2014 and 2017 at the appellate level for criminalizing
depictions that did not explicitly contain “sexual conduct.”
Today, the most current revision to 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2019), titled the
“Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act,” is still not strong enough to
accomplish its intended purpose of preventing depictions of animal cruelty.
The statute as written prohibits the sale of “obscene” depictions in interstate
commerce yet lacks a useful way to interpret exactly what types of content
that applies to. This means the statute has a much greater chance of being
challenged by a future court on the basis of constitutional overbreadth. To
address this, this article proposes two additional changes which would both

1. J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2019, B.A., University
of California, Los Angeles, 2013. I would like to thank my Professor, Jessica Vapnek, for
mentoring me as a legal writer and critical thinker throughout my last two years of law school.
Finally, a special thank you to all members of the Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment
Volume 1, 2019-2020, for their tremendous efforts.
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strengthen its enforcement and improve its likelihood of passing
constitutional muster. First, this Article argues that re-classifying crush
videos sold for profit under “commercial speech” would make it easier to
regulate because commercial speech based on the commission of underlying
criminal acts is illegal. Second, this article proposes enhancing the scienter
language of 18 U.S.C. § 48 with a “prurient intent” element, requiring
prosecutors to demonstrate that a particular depiction was made for
“prurient” purposes. Because courts would have to closely examine the
purpose and intent motivating production of crush video depictions, this
would reduce the likelihood of criminalizing protected speech. The statute
would therefore be more likely to pass constitutional muster.
This Article has six parts to support its argument. First, it examines the
background and legislative history of the federal anti-animal cruelty statute,
18 U.S.C. § 48, including weaknesses of subsequent amendments. Second,
the Article dissects both the majority and dissenting opinions of Stevens to
show how the Supreme Court departed from traditional obscenity analysis in
refusing to find the conduct compelling enough to ban outright. Third, to
show how the Court could have approached the obscenity issue, this Article
discusses First Amendment speech analysis as it relates to regulating
depictions of obscene speech in commercial contexts and on the internet.
Fourth, this Article reviews other federal and state court interpretations of
statutes criminalizing the dissemination of obscene materials to show that
there were other options available aside from invalidating for overbreadth.
Fifth, this Article argues that re-classifying crush videos sold for profit under
“commercial speech” would make it easier to regulate than creating a new
category of unprotected speech because commercial speech based on the
commission of underlying criminal acts is illegal. Sixth, this Article
proposes that enhancing the scienter language of 18 U.S.C. § 48 with a
“prurient intent” element would strengthen the statute to pass judicial review
by requiring prosecutors to use additional circumstantial evidence to
demonstrate that a particular depiction was made for “prurient” purposes.
Such closer examination into the purpose motivating production of crush
video depictions would rule out criminalizing protected speech. In addition,
this Article discusses alternative remedies for animal abusers guilty under 18
U.S.C. § 48 and beyond, and suggests a proactive, treatment-based approach
to address reducing recidivism in lieu of traditional, reactive incarceration.
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I. Introduction
In early 2010 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Stevens,2
holding that depictions of animal cruelty could not be criminalized under 18
U.S.C. § 48 because the statute also penalized individuals who produced
videos of injured animals for educational or hunting purposes. In that case,
dog trainer Robert Stevens was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 48 for three
videos he produced that showed dogs fighting one another and attacking a
domestic pig. In January 2005, he was found guilty in a district court for the
Western District Court of Pennsylvania. Stevens appealed to the Third
Circuit. That court subsequently vacated the lower court’s conviction on the
basis that the statute itself was not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict
scrutiny review, whereupon the government appealed the Supreme Court for
final review.3
The Supreme Court’s decision sent shockwaves through the animal
rights’ legal community and beyond, as it affirmed that portrayals of animal
cruelty could still be protected as “free speech” under the First Amendment.4
Eight of the nine Supreme Court justices agreed to overturn 18 U.S.C. § 48,
just 10 years since its enactment in 1999.5 The initial intent of Congress in
drafting such a statute was to eliminate the distribution of depictions of
extreme acts of animal cruelty, known colloquially as “animal crush
videos.”6 Congress justified restricting this type of speech to stop the
distribution of depictions for profit on the internet because state prosecutorial
methods were largely ineffective.7 The Supreme Court majority critiqued
the language of the statute for potentially criminalizing too many actions not
inherently obscene, finding it impermissibly overbroad.8 Justice Alito
disagreed, arguing that protecting animals against wanton torture should
serve as a compelling enough reason to uphold Stevens’s convictions for
selling videos of dog fights.9
Unfortunately, a community of online underground purveyors of
“animal crush” videos still thrives today, even somewhat revived since the
Stevens decision. Forums such as Reddit and counterculture site 4Chan have
2. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
3. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
4. Id.; see generally Brief for The Humane Society of the United States as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769).
5. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (1999).
7. 145 Cong. Rec. H10267 (1999).
8. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481–482.
9. Id.
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made it easier than ever for users to find and download crush videos—often
for a high price.10 Soon after Stevens, an investigation by the Humane
Society of the United States revealed an uptick in the use of internet-based
payment services such as PayPal and Western Union to facilitate the selling
of crush videos online.11
Historically, prosecuting the individuals responsible for the distribution
of videos in commerce was difficult, even though nearly every state bans the
act of animal abuse in itself.12 This is because applying any single state law
that prohibits the selling of animal crush videos is unconstitutional given the
interstate nature of the transactions.13 In reaction to this difficulty, legislators
passed the “Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act,”14 which aims to
complement state anti-animal cruelty laws by making the distribution of
animal crush videos “in or affecting interstate commerce” a Federal crime.15
The biggest problem with the latest version of the statute, however, is that
individuals may still use loopholes in the vague language of the Act to legally
produce and sell crush videos. This is because the language of the Act as
written does not make it easy to distinguish obscene depictions of animal
cruelty from other recognized categories of obscene speech.

II. Background
A. The Origins of 18 U.S.C. § 48 (1999)
Explicit depictions of animal cruelty in which small animals are
harmed, tortured, or killed for the sexual gratification of viewers have existed
since the 1950s, but became most apparent during the late 1990s when an
underground community began distributing such video depictions for profit
over the internet.16 Between 1997 and 2000, the Humane Society of the
United States located 2,000 animal crush videos available for sale between

10. REDDIT (July 18, 2018, 11:43 AM), https://www.reddit.com/r/insanepeopleface
book/comments/8zy71x/i_will_pay_you_15000_if_you_brutally_kill_a_tiny/.
11. Prohibiting Obscene Animal Crush Videos in the Wake of United States v. Stevens
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/CHRG-111shrg64411/html/CHRG-111shrg64411.htm.
12. H.R. Rep. No. 106-397 (1999).
13. Id. at 2 (“As Congress alone has the power to regulate interstate commerce . . .”).
14. Laws That Protect Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, https://aldf.org/pro
ject/preventing-animal-cruelty-and-torture-pact-act/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
15. 145 Cong. Rec. H10267 (1999).
16. Edward Wong, Long Island Case Sheds Light on Animal-Mutilation Videos, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2000), at B4.
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$30 to $300 each.17 One estimate gauged the profits of crush videos at just
under $1 million annually.18 Prior to the existence of a federal law which
imposed a felony-level charge, those who produced crush videos for
commercial gain were only charged with misdemeanor animal abuse.19
Even as awareness of crush videos spread beyond the insular
communities, not much could be done by state jurisdictions to prohibit sales
over the internet. In 1999, members of Congress drafted bill H.R. 1887 to
curb the production of “crush” videos in the United States and sold online by
criminalizing any depiction of “intentional killing” and general torture.20
The legislative history of the 1999 version of the statute highlights the
difficulties of prosecuting a two-fold crime that one, involved the underlying
conduct often taking place in private, and two, targeted audiences almost
entirely online.
Congress’s deliberations on H.R. 1887 in 1999 demonstrated the need
for regulating the distribution of obscene or prurient material at the advent
of the internet.21 That year, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 48, criminalizing
acts of knowingly creating, selling, or possessing only depictions capturing
animal cruelty, with the intention of placing the video into “interstate or
foreign commerce” for profit.22 18 U.S.C. § 48 even specifically exempted
depictions made for “serious religious, political, scientific, educational,
journalistic, historical, or artistic value” as a preliminary attempt to avoid
criminalizing free speech.23 When President Bill Clinton signed the bill, he
was aware that the statute posed a First Amendment conflict and explicitly
17. Id.
18. Press Release, The Humane Society of the United States, Animal Crush Videos:
Senate Committee Testimony (Sept. 15, 2010), https://www.humanesociety.org/news/ani
mal-crush-videos-senate-committee-testimony.
19. Id.
20. To Amend Title 18, United States Code, To Punish the Depiction of Animal Cruelty,
H.R. 1887, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted); see also Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of
2010, H.R. 5566, 111th Cong. (2010).
21. 145 Cong. Rec. H10267 (1999). The House of Representatives heard testimony by
Bill advocate and Ventura County Deputy District Attorney Tom Connors (one of several
Deputy District Attorneys responsible for prosecuting animal abuse cases to testify), who
described crush video clips produced by “Steponit Productions.” The production company
was responsible for distributing clips featuring a woman in boots or high heels speaking in a
sexually suggestive manner while slowly crushing small mammals. Connors argued that
prosecuting depictions was nearly impossible given the difficulty locating offenders inside
the three-year statute of limitations of many states’ laws. Connors lauded H.R. 1887 for
concentrating on reducing the commercial incentive of making profits post-production by
criminalizing the possession and distribution of the videos. Id.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 48(a)-(c) (1999) (emphasis added).
23. Id.
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called for only video depictions capturing “wanton cruelty to animals
designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex,” taken as a whole, to apply
under the statute.24 By the mid-2000s, the original sponsors of 18 U.S.C.
§ 48 stated the prevalence of animal crush videos was considerably
declining.25
The first federal statute was not without complications, however. In the
years following enactment, applying 18 U.S.C. § 48 proved to be difficult in
one regard because it contained certain words such as “animal” which varied
so widely in definition.26 For instance, the House Committee intended
“animal” to be defined according to its common, rather than scientific name,
but because many states have their own definition and a minority of states
even limit the definition of animal to only “domestic animals,” application
of the statute was not entirely clear.27
B. The Argument against Robert J. Stevens
In 2004 Robert J. Stevens, owner of a production company “Dogs of
Velvet,” was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 48 after a federal and state
investigation concluded that he had been producing and disseminating
videos of pit bulls fighting for money and training to hunt dogs.28 Stevens
was charged because the statute’s broad definition of animal “cruelty” also
criminalized purposeful conduct that resulted in “serious bodily injury” of a
nonhuman animal, which included selling depictions of animal fights.29 The
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Stevens’s
motion to dismiss, and a jury unanimously convicted him of three counts of
“knowing distribution of depictions of animal cruelty.”30 Stevens was
sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison for violating the statute. Stevens

24. 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 324, 1999 WL 33178029; see also Cassuto, David N., United
States v. Stevens: Win, Loss, or Draw for Animals?, 2 J. ANIMAL ETHICS 12 (2012).
25. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 492; see also Animal Cruelty, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (Mar. 18,
2016), https://sites.psu.edu/2civichofman/2016/03/18/animal-cruelty/.
26. Emma Ricaurte, Comment, Son of Sam and Dog of Sam: Regulating Depictions of
Animal Cruelty Through the Use of Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes, 16 ANIMAL L. 171, 179
(2009).
27. H.R. Rep. 106-397 (1999); see also Ricaurte, supra note 26, at 178.
28. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 466; Recent Case, United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d
Cir. 2008) (en banc), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (2009); see also Stevens, 533 F.3d at 221
(describing Stevens selling videos under the guise of “dog training” to avoid getting caught,
even though one such particularly disturbing video showed a dog attacking a domestic pig as
a “training” exercise).
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (1999); see also Stevens, 533 F.3d at 218.
30. Recent Case, supra note 28, at 1240.
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appealed on the basis that the statute was on its face overbroad and
criminalized or deterred legitimate forms of speech that involved killing
animals.31
In its petition for certiorari, the government emphasized the statute as
intended was to reinforce state law bans, and that the Court should focus on
the fact that the “harm from continued sale of the material so outweighs the
value of the material that it is appropriate to prohibit . . . such material in [its]
entirety.”32 The Government remained adamant that the risk of criminalizing
protected speech was minimal and did not justify entirely invalidating the
statute.33
The Supreme Court granted review on April 20, 2009.34 On behalf of
the majority, Chief Justice Roberts first emphasized that the Court’s decision
did not limit the ability to prohibit acts of animal cruelty.35 Rather, Roberts
argued it lacked substantial justification to prohibit such speech when acts of
depiction not “intrinsically related” to the underlying dangerous or criminal
conduct itself.36 Thus, Roberts rejected the Government’s argument that
depictions of animal cruelty belong in a class of unprotected speech, because
portrayals of an illegal underlying act of cruelty depart too far from
traditional First Amendment recognized classes of obscenity or the
incitement of violence. This was because the majority largely disregarded
the Chaplinsky balancing test,37 choosing instead to give much greater
weight to the five-factor Ferber test designed specifically to evaluate
depictions of child pornography.38 Ferber, which was decided over forty
years later, presented a unique set of facts that prompted the Court to do more

31. Bond, Jessica, Some Thoughts for Animal Lovers (and First Amendment
Aficionados) in the Wake of United States v. Stevens, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 59, 66 (citing
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481–483).
32. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir.
2008) (No. 08-769).
33. Id.
34. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 556 U.S. 1181
(U.S. April 20, 2009) (No. 08-769).
35. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474–475.
36 United States v. Stevens, THE MEDIA COALITION (May 15, 2013), https://www.
mediacoalition.org/us-v-stevens/, (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471).
37. See id. at 470–471 (noting that the Court did not heavily weigh the “societal costs”
of permitting a market of crush videos); see generally Chaplinsky v. United States, 315 U.S.
568 (1942). Chaplinsky established a more general “balancing” test that is applicable to
measuring the social benefit of obscene speech against the societal interest of order and
morality.
38. Recent Case, supra note 28, at 1245.
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than a cost-benefit analysis.39 In that case, the Court classified depictions of
child pornography on the basis that the material was “intrinsically related”
to the underlying crime and harm to children.40
Under Ferber, Roberts did not find criminalizing depictions of animal
abuse to be intrinsically related to preventing animal cruelty. Therefore,
Roberts argued the regulated behavior did not rise to a level of “compelling”
to justify criminalizing potentially legal speech and did not pass strict
scrutiny.41 Many critics of the decision echoed Robert’s argument that the
majority over-relied on the facts and reasoning of Ferber and under-relied
on the past precedent of general obscenity case law allowed the Court make
its decision based too closely on the facts of Ferber.42 Section D below will
clarify how the Stevens Court departed from prior First Amendment
precedent in deciding whether to classify categories of speech as protected.
The Court invalidated the statute as overbroad but did not address
whether the mere possession of depictions could be constitutionally
criminalized.43 Invalidation was justified because the statute never required
depictions of conduct to be “cruel,” rather that the conduct be “illegal” in
any jurisdiction.44 This presented another issue of criminalizing conduct
illegal in one jurisdiction but not another. The Court was not persuaded by
the government’s promise to use discretion in prosecuting only “extremely
cruel” media, which would exclude videos for journalistic or historic
purposes.45 The Court reasoned that the statute was “problematic” where the
criminalization of depictions of wounded or killed animals since it too easily
overextended to criminalize videos that did not involve intentional cruelty.
The facts of Stevens were representative of this problem because the
legislative history failed to articulate that the statute intended to target
dogfighting videos. The Court also dismissed the government’s argument
that narrowing the statute’s application to a crime after-the-fact would
impinge on the legislative branch powers as it would enable the enactment

39. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (citing New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982)).
40. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
41. See Stevens, 599 U.S. at 472 (noting that in the case of child pornography, a New
York statute criminalizing the sale and possession of depictions of child pornography departed
from the usual obscenity analysis because the depictions were so closely tied to the abuse of
children, necessitating a compelling governmental interest in regulating intrastate commerce
to prevent underlying acts).
42. See supra, note 28, at 1243.
43. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460, 482.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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of ambiguous laws that could be reinterpreted later in time.46 The decision
left open the possibility that a future statute which is more narrowly tailored
to address “crush videos” would be more constitutionally sound.47
Justice Alito’s dissent criticized the Court for not determining whether
Steven’s tape itself was illegal, nor for remanding back to the Third Circuit
for reconsideration on the issue.48 According to Alito, depictions of animal
crushing and torture deserves the same treatment as child pornography, given
that the crimes are done strictly for the purpose of recording it. Alito also
highlighted the high social value of protecting animals, albeit not as
compelling as protecting welfare of minors.49 Alito focused his argument on
the majority’s approach to the issue of overbreadth, given that a statute is
typically not overturned unless it is “substantially” overbroad.50 Alito
criticized the majority for basing its overbreadth argument on the mere
hypothetical chilling of legal speech rather than actual harm. Alito cited
Virginia v. Hicks to demonstrate this argument that a claimant must prove
overbreadth from the “text of [the law] and from actual fact.”51 Alito also
felt the Court had a duty to reasonably construe the statute narrowly, or in
accordance with the intent of Congress, which was to clearly exclude
individuals who possessed videos of hunting, one major concern of the
majority.52 Alito was convinced that in the event a legal depiction was
actually criminalized under § 48, it would be merely incidental, but not
“substantial” enough to justify overbreadth as the majority feared it would.53
Alito also demonstrated that the reasoning of Ferber, if applied more
accurately to the facts of Stevens, could have resulted in upholding the statute
because the distribution of obscene material is nearly inseparable from the
underlying criminal acts that cannot be prevented any other way.54 Alito
stressed that Congress was faced with only one choice: to ban commercial
profit making of lucrative animal crush videos or tolerate the continuation of
the underlying criminal acts.55 Finally, Alito recognized that the United
46. Id. at 480.
47. Id. at 482; see also David LaBahn, LEX CANIS: ASS’N OF PROSECUTING ATT’YS Q.,
Summer 2010 at 1, https://www.apa-inc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/LC-2.2.pdf.
48. Id. at 483 (Alito, S., dissenting).
49. Id. at 493–496.
50. Id. at 484.
51. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (citing N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of
New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988)).
52. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 487, 490 (Alito, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 489.
54. Id. at 494.
55. Id. at 495.
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States has a longstanding history of condemning intentional acts of cruelty
thus speech depicting intentional cruelty to animals lacking any redeeming
social value should not be protected.56
The Stevens opinion was criticized not only for the misapplication of
Ferber but also for disregarding the fact that the underlying conduct was
nearly impossible to prosecute.57 Critics of the opinion expressed frustration
as to why the Court invalidated the statute yet upheld depictions of
recreational killing, given that depictions of recreational killing lacked
enough “serious” value to be protected within one of the statute’s exceptions
and were not protected as a fundamental right.58 This interpretation on behalf
of the Court was very unusual because the Judicial branch typically must
first determine the legislative intent of a statute prior to invalidating it on
overbreadth grounds in order to determine whether the regulation is
excessive in punishment.59 The Court’s decision not to classify depictions
of torturous acts as a new category of obscenity speech due to the absence of
an explicitly depiction of “sexual conduct,” as well as the lack of a prior
“tradition” in doing so, was seen by some as an affront to the progress of
animal rights.60
Almost immediately after the decision was released, H.R. 5092 and
H.R. 5337 were announced and garnered bipartisan support.61 The
proponent behind H.R. 5092, Representative Gary Peters of Michigan,
explained the urgency for Congress to enact the new narrower bill given the
resurgence of the online community following the ruling.62 As a result of
input from the hearing, H.R. 5566 was introduced in July 2010 by the House
of Representatives unanimously as a way to address the Court’s main

56.
57.

Id. at 496.
Alison Frankel, Why violence, but not sex, is protected by the First Amendment,
REUTERS (July 23, 2012), http://www.blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/07/23/why-vio
lence-but-not-sex-is-protected-by-the-first-amendment/.
58. Harold Lloyd, Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals: The Semiotics of Free
Expression, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 237, 266–267 (2012).
59. Meredith Shafer, Perplexing Precedent: United States V. Stevens Confounds A
Century of Supreme Court Conventionalism and Redefines The Limits Of “Entertainment”,
19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 296 (2012).
60. See Brief for the Humane Society of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note
4; see also Stevens, 533 F. 3d at 237.
61. David LaBahn, LEX CANIS: ASS’N OF PROSECUTING ATT’YS Q., Summer 2010 Vol. 2
Issue 2 at 1, https://www.apa-inc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/LC-2.2.pdf.
62. Id.
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concerns.63 In September 2010, the Senate passed a reformed version of
H.R. 5566 known as the Prevention of Interstate Commerce in Animal Crush
Videos Act of 2010.64 This revised Act limited the statute language to “crush
videos,” addressed conduct illegal under federal or state law, and introduced
an exception that excluded various forms of hunting and agricultural
practices.65 At the proceedings and debates of the 111th Congress (second
session) Senator Patrick Leahy highlighted well-established First
Amendment exceptions that would justify the constitutionality of passing a
narrowed statute such as the prohibition of interstate sale of obscene
materials and the compelling need to regulate speech integral to criminal
conduct.66 The legislation was signed into law by President Barack Obama
in December of 2010.
Unlike the previous version of the law, P.L. 111-294 added a
requirement to the statutory language that animal crush videos need to be
“obscene.”67 This is significant because the Stevens Court, which heavily
focused on Ferber, did not discuss the meaning of “obscene” as defined in
Miller v. California, also known as the Miller test for obscenity.68 The Miller
test for obscenity requires “obscene” material to depict sexual conduct.69 The
Stevens reasoning was reflected heavily in the reasoning of Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, which involved a statute that deliberately
left out language that conduct must depict “sexual conduct.”70 In that case,
the California law banning the sale of certain violent video games based its
definition of “violent video game” on the Miller test, which argued for the
creation of a new category of unprotected speech. The Court held that
because the law tried to create a new category of content-based regulation
but was still too vague on the definition of “violent,” it was not compelling
enough to pass strict scrutiny.71

63. KATHERINE A. RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41457, BANNING CRUSH VIDEOS:
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN U.S. V. STEVENS AND LINGERING
FIRST AMENDMENT QUESTIONS 4 (2010).
64. 156 Cong. Rec. S7653, 7653-54 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 7653-7654 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
67. Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 Stat. 3177.
68. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
69. Id.
70. Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n., 564 U.S. 788, 788-90 (2011).
71. Id. at 787.
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As of early 2020, the latest update to 18 U.S.C. § 48 was introduced in
the House on February 13, 2019, as H.R. 724.72 The bill expands the criminal
provisions to include “intentional acts of crushing” but adds exceptions
where a video is made for purpose of euthanizing an animal, necessary to
protect life or property, or for scientific reasons.73 An additional subsection
excludes “unintentional” depictions of where an animal is injured or killed.74
Unfortunately, the language of the new statute does not sufficiently provide
a more precise mechanism to determine what qualifies as “obscene.”75 The
language fails to clarify how the criminalizing of intentional acts of animal
crushing on a federal level should be distinguished from conduct that a court
does not find to fall into an exception. The bill passed the House and Senate
without any changes to the language since its introduction and was signed
into law on November 25, 2019, as the “Preventing Animal Cruelty and
Torture Act.” PACT focuses on prohibiting the sale of depictions in
interstate commerce, rather than articulate what constitutes an “obscene”
depiction.76
C. Balancing the Interaction between the First Amendment,
Obscene Speech, and Freedom of Religion
The following section is a discussion of obscenity analysis generally
and how it relates to Stevens, given that much of the Court’s reasoning in
that decision was based on prior case law regarding laws that attempted to
regulate obscene speech.77
i. Regulating the Freedom of Speech and Categorizing “Obscene”
Speech
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the
government from regulating speech on the basis of viewpoint and subject
matter, in order to promote a marketplace of ideas and self-governance.78
Roth v. United States was the first case to distinguish First Amendment
72. Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act or the PACT Act, H.R. 724, 116th Cong.
(2019).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 Stat. 3177.
77. Michael Reynolds, Depictions of the Pig Roast: Restricting Violent Speech Without
Burning the House, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 341, 377–78 (2009).
78.

U.S. Const. amend. I., cl.2.

4 - Radford_HJCP_V1-2

Summer 2020]

5/13/2020 11:38 AM

United States v. Stevens at 10

233

protections from speech considered “obscene.”79 In 1948, the Court struck
down as vague a section of the New York penal code that attempted to
criminalize the possession or circulation of “obscene, lewd, lascivious …
magazines,” in Winters v. New York.80 The court in Winters was concerned
that the statute was too broad and abridged free speech by prohibiting the
circulation of “stories of deeds or bloodshed or lust.”81
Nearly thirty years later, the constitutional restriction for laws
prohibiting the distribution of generally obscene materials was limited to
materials of a “prurient” nature based on a three-part test.82 United States v.
Miller involved the criminalization of dissemination of advertisements and
brochures containing “adult material” mailed to recipients who found the
images of fornication disturbing and alerted the police.83 The Court
introduced a novel test to evaluate whether the regulating of “pornographic”
conduct of the brochures was protected by the First Amendment.84 This new
Miller test exempted any speech considered prurient and not containing
serious “redeeming” purpose was not protected free speech under the First
Amendment and further specified that “sexual conduct” could include
representations of those sexual acts.85

79. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 488–89 (1957); see also Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (Stewart, J., concurring) (highlighting that obscenity does not have
a bright line). In the early days of obscenity recognition, distinguishing when protected
speech crossed into obscenity was based on Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it”
determination. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197; see also Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R.
3 Q.B. 360. Whereas Roth was the first United States case to establish a common law standard
of obscenity, Regina “allowed [potentially obscene] material to be judged merely by the effect
of an isolated except upon particularly susceptible persons.” Id.
80. See Winters v. N.Y., 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Winters was among the first obscenity
cases to discuss the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the distribution of generically
obscene materials.
81. Id. at 518.
82. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973).
83. Id. at 36. Miller, who owned an adult-content printing company, was charged with
violating a California penal code section criminalizing the intentional dissemination of any
obscene matter.
84. Id. at 24, 36.
85. Id. at 24. When offensive content satisfies all prongs of the Miller test, it is
considered “obscene.” That is, 1) that the average person applying contemporary standards
would find that the work (considered in the whole) appeals to prurient interests, 2) whether
the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct defined by the
applicable state law, and 3) whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. Id. at 21.
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Nine years after United States v. Miller, the Court in New York v. Ferber
declared depictions of child pornography unprotected speech.86 Ferber
departed from the Miller three-prong test which was specifically based on
laws regulating the depictions of pornographic content. The Court described
the need to greatly adjust the Miller test given the visual depictions of
underage sexual exhibitions.87 The Ferber Court was satisfied with the
connection between visual depictions and underlying conduct because the
possibility of also prohibiting legal speech was de minimis, given the
underlying criminal conduct lacked redeeming value.88
The application of the Ferber analysis in Stevens ran contrary to other
First Amendment cases decided around the same time including American
Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, et al. v. Ted Strickland,
Richard Cordroy, et al.89 Following Ferber, the Court in Osbourne v. Ohio
limited the child pornography exception to acts of mere possession but did
not extend categorical protection to the mere possession of obscene
materials.90 The Court in Osborne v. Ohio also upheld a law that
criminalized any virtual depictions of child pornography.91 Ferber and
Osborne both weighed the constitutionality of statutes that criminalized
depictions and possession of child pornography statutes. Unlike the
reasoning in Stevens, the Court's reasoning undermined the statute for its
hypothetical overbreadth, the Court in both Ferber and Osborne was
reluctant to overturn the statutes entirely because of a small hypothetical
number of depictions with value.92
The progression of case law on depictions of obscene material from
Winters to Miller to Ferber demonstrates that courts have been reluctant to
consider depictions of criminal acts as “obscenity” unless the depiction
concerns a crime of human interest, such as harm to children. However, one

86. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982). Justice White found that the test for
obscenity did not need to be equated with the prurient interests of the average person by a
community standard, nor even be considered “as a whole.” Id. at 764. It was therefore held that
visual depictions and communications of child pornography, even if not obscene, are not
protected under the First Amendment because of the substantial link to child abuse. Id. at 773.
87. Id. at 764. A New York statute was upheld for prohibiting persons from promoting
sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by restricting the distribution of
material depicting those performances.
88. Id. at 756.
89. See generally Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Strickland, 560 F.3d
443 (6th Cir. 2009).
90. See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564–568 (1969).
91. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103.
92. See supra, notes 86 and 90.
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problem in extending the Miller obscenity framework to cases involving the
distribution of obscene content is the challenge of developing a singular
objective “contemporary community standard”93 by which to evaluate the
conduct.94 Thus, it is difficult to interpret a federal law such as 18 U.S.C.
§ 48 given the dynamic contemporary community standards of the internet.95
Recall Justice Alito dissented that there is a strong connection between
regulating depiction of videos in order to target the underlying crime.
Therefore, depictions of animal crush or cruelty may easily be taken out of
context without the presence of additional language to clarify that only
specific content which applies to “prurient interests” should be regulated by
18 U.S.C. § 48. The fact that the current amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 48
still lacks a limiting instruction that a particular depiction be “taken as a
whole” by a court indicates the statute remains weak.
A limiting instruction would remedy over-inclusiveness so that a
depiction be “taken as a whole.” Under such an instruction, depictions of
intentional cruelty to animals would only be viewed as “criminal” under 18
U.S.C. § 48 if the primary purpose of the Act targets creation for prurient
interests, or can be exempted by serving a culturally significant purpose. It
is important to note that the addition of such narrowing language would
likely exclude depictions of dogfighting or cockfighting, the conduct that
Stevens was arrested for filming.
ii. Anti-Animal Cruelty Statutes and the Freedom of Religion
Preventing animal cruelty and preserving the freedom of religion
presents a unique problem for courts in deciding cases because it involves
prosecuting intentional acts of abuse that are codified as illegal but are
essential practices in some religions. Like laws regulating free speech, laws
aimed at limiting religious practices must also meet strict scrutiny. The

93. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. Recall that Roth and subsequently Miller adopted the
“community standard” requirement to measure whether “prurient” material “offended the
common conscience of the community by present-day standards.” Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 490 (1957).
94. Id. (“The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered
as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach. In
other words, you determine its impact upon the average person in the community. The books,
pictures and circulars must be judged as a whole, in their entire context, and you are not to
consider detached or separate portions in reaching a conclusion).
95. David L. Hudson Jr., Pornography & Obscenity, FREEDOM FORUM INSTITUTE (July
2009), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-sp
eech-2/adult-entertainment/pornography-obscenity/.
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following section examines how the courts balanced upholding First
Amendment freedom of religion with the desire to preserve animal lives.
The analysis balancing anti-animal cruelty statutes and the freedom of
religion changed after the seminal Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith in which the Court upheld Oregon’s right to deny
unemployment insurance to those using peyote for religious purposes.96 The
Court found it immaterial that the use of peyote was considered criminal
under the state law because the law was neutral and the effect of inhibiting
any religious freedom was incidental.97 When the Court decided Stevens, it
had been nearly twenty years since it had last heard a case involving the First
Amendment and Free Exercise Clause. Prior to Smith in 1990, the Court was
required to adhere to the “strict scrutiny” test—satisfaction of which requires
the government to show that the law is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling interest—to justify restricting speech or religion.98
Smith established that a law must intentionally discriminate against a
religious practice or have the effect of discriminating in order to be deemed
invalid or unconstitutional.99 The Court determined that “neutral, generally
applicable” criminal statutes need only pass the lower threshold of rational
basis.100 “Neutral, generally applicable” statutes are likely to pass rational
basis if their purpose is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
For example, a “neutral, generally applicable” law prohibiting certain
slaughtering techniques on the grounds of animal cruelty would be
constitutional under Smith because it lacks intentional motive to
discriminate. Therefore, applying the Smith reasoning would likely ensure
that a more neutrally worded statute would only incidentally burden the right
to free speech and thus be more likely to pass rational basis review.
Three years after Smith, the Supreme Court decided the first seminal
case involving an anti-animal cruelty statute and the freedom of religion. In
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court considered
the question of whether laws preventing animal cruelty rose to the level of
compelling state interest against the interests of followers seeking to
preserve the ways of the Santeria religion.101 The Court in Lukumi
overturned a city ordinance that banned intentional killings of chickens and
goats for sacrificial ceremonies. The Lukumi Court did not apply the Smith
framework because the act facially discriminated against the Santeria
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Emp. Division, Dep’t of Hum. Resources of Or. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1990).
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 665.
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. V. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

4 - Radford_HJCP_V1-2

Summer 2020]

5/13/2020 11:38 AM

United States v. Stevens at 10

237

religion rather than inadvertently, unlike the prohibition of peyote in
Employment Division.102 The Court in Lukumi also refused to decide if the
protection of animals was a “compelling interest.”103 The Court’s aversion
to deciding this issue arises because the law treats animals differently in
regard to their role and proximity to humans in society. The Humane
Slaughter Rule, for instance, protects grazing cattle but not chickens and
turkeys.104 Since the law only protects certain animals from certain types of
treatment and the societal interests in protecting animals differs depending
on their purpose, determining if a compelling interest applies to all animals
is difficult.
In Stevens, the majority relied on Lukumi to make the case that
depictions of animal abuse were not compelling enough to justify the First
Amendment violations. In his dissent, Alito distinguished the universally
applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 48 criminalization of crush videos from the
ordinance specifically tailored to target the Santeria religion in Lukumi.
A more fact-specific inquiry could focus on existing laws, animals
involved, and degree of public concern. This means that prior case law on
unprotected categories of speech allows finding one type of wanton cruelty
or killing to be barred as a compelling interest while another form of killing
is permitted. The above section illustrates how the Supreme Court has
interpreted laws designed to stop the harmful effects of intentional animal
cruelty when such laws inhibit the Freedom of Religion.
iii. An Argument for Regulating Depictions of Intentional Animal
Cruelty as Commercial Speech
There are nine officially recognized categories of speech not protected
by the First Amendment. These include obscenity, fighting words,
defamation, perjury, blackmail, incitement of lawless action, actual threats,
solicitation to commit a crime, and child pornography.105 Over the past fifty
years, the Supreme Court has been increasingly less inclined to recognize
new categories of unprotected speech.106 This trend is rooted in the Court’s

102. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
103. Id. at 546–547.
104. See Cassuto, supra note 24, at 15.
105. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 1 (2010).
106. Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Institute of Technology, Animal Cruelty,
Crush Videos and US v. Stevens, YOUTUBE (July 25, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vjwm-aQlrFE.
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consideration of categories of speech based only on a tradition of
proscription rather than what the legislature finds “shocking.”107
Stevens changed the way a court determines if speech should be
categorized as protected under the First Amendment,108 given its departure
from the traditional cost-benefit balancing test used to gauge unprotectable
obscenity speech.109 Consider the Court’s focus on the fact that depictions
of animal cruelty do not have longstanding historical tradition of being
prohibited.110 The majority’s reasoning did not consider that the statute may
be a necessary step to ending the criminal practice of animal abuse.111
Regulating the for-profit animal crush industry as “commercial speech”
presents one option to make it easier for such laws to pass judicial review.
This is because speech is considered commercial when it “regards solely the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”112 Commercial speech
has historically required that a statute meet “intermediate scrutiny.”113 This
means that laws regulating commercial speech are valid if supported by
“substantial” government interest and are not illegal or misleading. The
Supreme Court has found that commercial speech that which incites illegal
activity, to be unprotected speech.114 For example, a “content-neutral” antianimal cruelty statute could pass judicial review if enacted with the purpose
of targeting the commercial aspect of advertising and distributing all
depictions of animal abuse that meet the definition of intentional criminal
animal abuse under state law. Therefore, categorizing animal crush videos
as “commercial speech” given that they are profit-driven, advertised for to
some degree, and highly likely to incite illegal activity creates one potential
path to outlawing such videos.

107. Ent. Merchants Ass’n., 564 U.S. at 792.
108. See, e.g., Charles W. Rhodes, The Historical Approach to Unprotected Speech and
the Quantitative Analysis of Overbreadth, in United States v. Stevens, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES
5227 (LexisNexis July 30, 2010).
109. See Cassuto, supra note 24.
110. See supra, note 86.
111. Cassuto, supra note 24 at 17.
112. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
113. Id. at 573.
114. Id. at 571–572.
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D. Regulating Interstate Speech and the Commerce Clause
The legislative record of section 48 illustrates that Congress’s intent to
use its interstate commerce power to supplement the authority of the states
to bring those who profit from animal abuse to justice.115 State law is nearly
ineffective at regulating and criminalizing individuals who sell obscene
content across jurisdictions over the internet because many crush videos are
purposely made in anonymity to avoid identification for prosecution under
animal cruelty laws. Even if prosecutors are able to identify the actors, there
is no way to verify where videos are made and whether they are within the
applicable statute of limitations since it runs from the date the conduct
occurred.116 More specifically, the statute of limitations to prosecute
individuals under many state laws begins when the depiction of intentional
abusive conduct was made or distributed and not.117 Therefore, the
importance of a strong federal ban on depictions of inherent animal cruelty
(that are also clearly produced for self-gratification purposes only) was
necessary as the reach of state laws were largely ineffective.
Congress has attempted to regulate obscenity on the internet in a
number of ways.118 In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency
Act of 1996, which was only partially upheld after Reno v. ACLU struck
down parts of it down for clashing with the First Amendment.119 The Miller
test (as discussed in Section C, supra) for obscenity was applied to material
displayed on the Internet seven years before Stevens, when the Court ruled
on the regulation of obscenity over the Internet. In Ashcroft v. ACLU, the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA) was challenged because it criminalized
material that was legal for adults to view, thereby unconstitutionally chilling
115. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 8 (1999) (citing 145 CONG. REC. H10267-01 (daily
ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (discussing Congressional authority to
regulate interstate commerce of illegal goods for profit)).
116. Shafer, supra note 59, at 283.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
a New York statute unconstitutional for violating the Dormant Commerce Clause by
regulating content accessible in other states under New York law). The Pataki Court stated
that criminalizing potentially legal user activities over the internet would violate regulatory
powers that prohibit the government from exercising authority beyond its boundaries. Id. at
169. This produced a chilling effect beyond the state’s ability to prosecute website owners,
potentially resulting in the inconsistent and uncertain application of multiple states’ laws over
the same content. See also, PSInet, Inc. v. Chapman, 372 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding a
Virginia statute that banned the “knowing display for commercial purpose” of pornographic
materials over the internet placed undue burden on interstate Commerce by restricting access
to online materials in another state’s jurisdiction).
119. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 846-47 (1997).
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speech.120 In Ashcroft, the Court recognized the importance of construing
statutes in a modern lens, taking into account the use of local community
standards. The Supreme Court in that case found that COPA violated the
First Amendment for condemning legal conduct and because the software
did not protect children using the least restrictive means possible.121 The
Court rejected, however, Respondent’s argument that the statute was
overbroad where only “some” overbreadth was demonstrated, holding that
any basis for overbreadth must be both real and substantial.122
As a Federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 48 invokes the Commerce Clause
because the statute attempts to regulate the distribution of commercial media
for profits on interstate “channels” such as the internet. Case law from the
past two decades has swung against the regulation of online activities by
statute under the intricacies of the Commerce Clause and Dormant
Commerce Clause.123 Thus, federal statutes passed to regulate the
transmission of obscene content on the internet (as 18 U.S.C. § 48) face
another obstacles for being unconstitutional against state powers. The
passage of the latest form of 18 U.S.C. § 48 in 2019 clearly highlights the
reliance on the Commerce Clause powers to regulate certain speech when
necessary.124
While many opponents of 18 U.S.C. § 48 initially claimed that state
laws already made illegal the act itself, they failed to recognize the power of
Congress to regulate mechanisms of interstate commerce. Given the
heightened ability to produce, disseminate, and sell content generally over
the Internet today, the Commerce Clause can and has been used to regulate
instrumentalities of trade, thus it was imperative for state legislators to
incorporate the Clause’s principles into the latest version of 18 U.S.C. § 48
(2019). “PACT” as written today embraces the Commerce Clause and
120. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 568. (In that case, the Court of Appeals had
difficulty interpreting a statute that imposed a $50,000 fine and six months in prison for the
distribution of obscene material “harmful to minors” using the extremely broad “community
standard” (also discussed above) because such a standard for obscenity varied greatly on
internet.).
121. Id. at 571–572.
122. Id. at 584.
123. Id.
124. Cf. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496
(1982) (in Hoffman Estates, the Supreme Court ruled on an ordinance aimed at prohibited all
marketing of drug paraphernalia unless the publisher possessed a license. The owner of a
paraphernalia store challenged the ordinance as vague and potentially overbroad. The Court
upheld the ordinance and refused to apply the overbreadth doctrine, reiterating that the
overbreadth does not apply to the regulation of commercial speech. This was because the
language of the statute regulated only commercial marketing behavior and reiterated that the
government may ban speech which proposes an illegal transaction.).
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expressly prohibits both depictions of wanton abuse on federal property or
in interstate commerce and the underlying act itself. However, the federal
act is still weak where it does not address the potential of criminalizing free
speech even with the use of exceptions. Finally, “PACT” does not rewrite
the 2010 version, but only applies to depictions that are distributed in
interstate commerce or on federal property, leaving some of the previous
statute’s weaknesses exposed. Even the most recent version of 18 U.S.C.
§ 48 could be strengthened as a statute and pass judicial review if it instead
aimed to regulate depictions made for profit for sale as “commercial speech,”
which has historically been regulated according to intermediate scrutiny.125
Speech is considered “commercial” when it regards commercial
advertising, promises, and solicitations.126 This is because laws regulating
commercial speech are valid if supported by “substantial” government
interest and are not illegal or misleading. The Supreme Court found in 1980
that commercial speech which is misleading or promotes illegal activity is
not protected by the First Amendment, even if only the underlying activity
is banned.127 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm’n., the Court reiterated that laws regulating commercial speech as the
offspring of economic self-interest and are not “particularly susceptible to
being [invalidated] by overbroad regulation.”128 Because Congress used its
Commerce Clause power in passing 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2019), future courts
should approach distributions of animal crush videos as inherently
“commercial” in their reasoning. A more pragmatic anti-animal cruelty
statute could expressly regulate the “commercial speech” aspect of
advertising and distributing depictions, particularly because statutes that
regulate commercial speech are incapable of being overbroad.129 Doing so
may help resolve some of the loopholes created by having undefined
“exceptions” where such depictions of animal crushing or abuse would be
considered legal.

125.
126.
(1980).
127.
128.
129.

Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562
See id. at 563–564.
Id. at 564, n.6.
See Hudson, supra note 95.
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E. Other Alternatives to Getting 18 U.S.C. § 48 around Judicial
Review
The Court in Stevens determined that the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 48 did
not satisfy a “compelling governmental interest” by a test normally applied
only to depictions of child pornography rather than the traditional test for
obscenity. The following section explains why 18 U.S.C § 48 had such a
high constitutional threshold to pass and discusses how restructuring the
language of the state may help it pass judicial review in the future.
Recall that the Court in Stevens did not find that preventing underlying
crimes of animal abuse was enough to justify preserving the law, despite
numerous amicus briefs, such as the one filed by Northwest Animal Rights
Network, that articulated how criminalizing depictions of animal abuse was
just as compelling as other unprotected types of speech. The brief provided
numerous examples of causal links between flagrant animal abuse and other
types of violence against others, as well as why it is necessary for the federal
government to have a carefully drafted legislative mechanism to ensure
humane treatment of animals. Rejecting these arguments, the Court was
heavily persuaded by the fact that federal regulation of depictions of animal
cruelty was less compelling because nearly every state already criminalizes
intentional animal abuse.
When legislators attempt to criminalize the depictions of speech, the
federal government has the burden to prove their justification in inhibiting
that speech. Regulating an activity based on the content of the speech itself
requires the government satisfy strict scrutiny.130 Part of the next challenge
in reworking 18 U.S.C. § 48 will be to frame the statute in such a way so that
it is not content-based but is content-neutral. A law is content-neutral (and
requires only intermediate scrutiny) when it applies to all expression without
regard to the substance or message of expression.131 The content-neutrality
of a statute is ensured if it regulates all intentional acts of criminal abuse
under state law without criminalizing legal conduct. Redrafting 18 U.S.C. §
48 to be neutrally applicable means a Court would be less inclined to strike
it down for being overbroad.

130. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
131. David L. Hudson Jr., Content Neutral, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA
(last visited May 2, 2020), https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/937/content-neutral
(Intermediate scrutiny requires the government need only demonstrate that the regulation of
speech is done for an important governmental purpose and is narrowly tailored to accomplish
that purpose).
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III. How Other Courts Have Interpreted Similar Laws that
Impinge on Protected First Amendment Speech Rights
There is a dearth of case law discussing how federal courts have ruled
on the constitutionality of statutes criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty.
To provide perspective, it is important to show how different statutes that
attempt to criminalize the dissemination of obscene materials have fared
under the law.
A. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Sixth Circuit initially heard American Booksellers Foundation for
Free Expression, et al. v. Ted Strickland, Richard Cordray, et al. to certify
two questions of law as to the proper interpretation of Ohio Revised Code §
2907.01 subparts (E) and (J).132 Subpart (E) prohibited the distribution or
display of certain sexually explicit materials considered “harmful to
juveniles” whereas subpart (D) prohibited the “[remote transmission] by
means of a method of mass distribution.”133 The language of § 2907.01 was
amended prior to appeal to explicitly state that the statute only applied to
“personally directed” communications (such as instant messaging and chat
rooms), not “generally accessible” communications (accessible publicly).134
At the district level, Plaintiffs argued that both subparts of (D) were
overbroad and resulted in chilling adult-to-adult speech, given that it was
unclear when an individual would have knowledge of the legality of
materials they were prosecuted for possessing.135 The district court found
that the definition of “material harmful to minors” failed the Miller test
because it also criminalized legal speech, such as adults in possession of such
material.136 The Sixth Circuit certified both questions, and the outcome of
both questions was resolved in 2010 by the Ohio Supreme Court, which held
the statute should be limited in scope only to electronic communications that
can be “personally directed” rather than means of mass distribution which
do not allow a sender to prevent distribution to particular recipients.137
The American Booksellers cases demonstrates that courts demand a
greater level of certainty where a vague criminal statute may “induce
132. See generally Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Strickland, 560 F.3d
443, 446 (6th Cir. 2009).
133. Id. at 445–446.
134. Id. at 447.
135. Id. at 444.
136. Id.
137. See Am. Booksellers Found. v. Cordray, 124 Ohio St. 3d 329, 332.
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individuals to forgo their rights of speech, press, and association” to avoid a
threat of prosecution and chilling speech.138
B. Florida
In Gonzalez v. State, Defendant Sebastian Gonzalez was charged under
Florida statute § 828.122(3)(h) for “knowingly” using an animal for the
purpose of fighting another animal. Mr. Gonzalez was the first to challenge
the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds of overbreadth given that
innocent bystanders lacking intent could also be prosecuted.139 The court
used the reasoning from a similar Tennessee case to find the statute
constitutional, in which the court distinguished from prohibiting knowingly
being present at an animal fight from just being present at an unlawful animal
fight. Gonzalez also challenged the statutory language for failing to define
“attend” and requested that the court construe the statute in his favor (Rule
of Lenity).140 Ultimately, the court held that the statute was not vague
because the language was clear and unambiguous, thus the “clear and plain
meaning prevails.”141 Gonzalez demonstrated the importance of sufficiently
articulating the level of intent required to penalize an individual for
producing a depiction.142
The statutory vagueness discussed in Gonzalez is similar to what the
majority in Stevens latched on to in their reasoning. The court in Gonzalez
pointed out that the legislature’s choice of words such as “wound” and “kill”
did not evince that depictions need to be of “cruel” nature to be criminal.
Such broad language ultimately convinced the Court that the specific words
used should be construed per their plain meanings to reduce the risk of

138. See also KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp.
2d 857, 888 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
139. Gonzalez v. State, 941 So. 2d 1226, 1227–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See also
Kerry Adams, Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty: Unconstitutional or a Valid
Restriction on Speech?, 12 BARRY L. REV. 203 (citing Complaint at 2, Advanced Consulting
and Marketing Inc. v. Gonzales, No. 1:o7cv21767, 2007 WL 2049319 (S.D. Fla. July 10,
2007)). Advanced Consulting and Marketing Inc. v. Gonzales was among one of the first suits
to challenge the constitutionality of banning depictions of conduct legal in another jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 48. Advance Consulting and Marketing Inc. represents the dilemma of
criminalizing depictions accessible over the internet where the underlying conduct was legal
where it was produced.
140. Gonzalez, 941 So. 2d at 1229 (explaining that the Rule of Lenity describes a tool of
statutory interpretation where an ambiguity in language is so grievous the court must guess
as to meaning). See generally Barber v. Thomas, 560 U. S. 474, 488 (2010).
141. Gonzalez, 941 So. 2d at 1229.
142. Id.
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convicting individuals for legal conduct.143 While the most current version
of 18 U.S.C. § 48 does articulate the required mens rea as “purposefully,”
Gonzalez also demonstrates that if the actual crime itself is not defined
clearly, the Court must interpret the plain meaning in favor of the
defendant.144 Appling the principle of clear statutory construction from
Gonzalez to Stevens underscores the necessity for future versions of the
statutes to focus on the specific type of intent needed and provide better
definitions of intent for the Court.
C. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Sessions was the final
decision of multiple cases regarding the First Amendment constitutionality
of a statute that required producers of adult sexually explicit imagery to
maintain detailed records of each performer.145 Although the cases did not
concern depictions of animal cruelty, they involve the constitutionality of
injunctions prohibiting depictions and overbreadth of the statute. The
District Court upheld injunctions in favor of the producer-Plaintiffs where it
found certain provisions to be unconstitutional but ultimately rejected their
facial overbreadth claim.146 The court concluded that there was no longer a
clear dividing line between remedies that are proper when a statute is either
“facially” unconstitutional or unconstitutional “as applied.”147 Analogizing
to Stevens, in which the government in that case argued for a limited
interpretation of “depictions of animal cruelty” to apply to only “extreme”
animal cruelty, the Court in Free Speech Coalition (I) reasoned it could not
engage in essentially “rewriting” statutes.148 Soon after, the Court in Free
Speech Coalition (II) decided against limiting the reach of the statute and
only upheld the provisions of the statute that were the least restrictive means
of accomplishing the statute’s goals. District Judge Michael Baylson
described the difficulty of facial attacks to statutes for overbreadth stating,
“there is no longer a strict dividing line between the relief that would be
proper when a statute is facially unconstitutional, as opposed to a statute

143. See Shafer, supra note 59, at 314.
144. Gonzalez supra, note 135.
145. See generally Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Sessions, 322 F. Supp. 3d 605 (E.D. Pa.
2018) (stating that the statute would have violated the test for substantive overbreadth by
criminalizing adult entertainment professionals for legal conduct).
146. Id. at 612.
147. Free Speech Coal., Inc., F. Supp. 3d at 612 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
148. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. AG of the United States, 677 F.3d 519, 539 (3d Cir.
2013). Cf. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. AG United States, 787 F.3d 142.

4 - Radford_HJCP_V1-2

246

5/13/2020 11:38 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:2

being declared unconstitutional.”149 This grey area highlights the power the
Court has to invalidate a statute entirely or limit its application on a case by
case basis so that something of value may still come out of the decision. If
this reasoning had been applied to Stevens, the Court could have ruled on
part of the statute rather than striking it down entirely for being overbroad.
D. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Following Stevens, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Richards,
the reasoning of which reflected ongoing weaknesses of the 2010 revisions
to 18 U.S.C. § 48. The facts of Richards, unlike Stevens, involved the
prosecution of animal crush videos where defendant Ashley Nicole Richards
and her accomplice Brent Justice restrained animals and tortured them to
death on camera while making sexually suggestive comments in the
background.150 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument
and highlighted that § 48 fit within the “secondary effects” exception which
permits a statute to regulate a content-based subclass based on its secondary
effects, or the “wanton killing and torture” behind animal crush videos.151 In
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals extensively referred to the
Congressional intent as a tool to narrow the proper interpretation of animal
crush videos independent of traditional violence-obscenity statutes and
worth of “special punishment.”152
In deciding Richards, the court applied the Miller obscenity test
(discussed previously) to the added “obscene” requirement of 18 U.S.C. §
48, meaning conduct would be considered obscene if it met the three-part
test for prurience. The Court did not address the point raised by the majority
in Stevens that depictions must be of sexual conduct. This issue was raised
three years later when the Fifth Circuit heard United States v. Justice in 2017.
On appeal, the Court in Justice addressed in the appeal the narrower
question of whether the depictions of animal crushing constituted sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way.153 Defendant-cameraman Brent Justice
argued that the depictions did not constitute an example of the patently
offensive sexual conduct provided in Miller.154 The Court of Appeals
concluded that the obscenity of the videos be factually evaluated case-by-

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Free Speech Coal., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d at 611.
United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 277 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
Id. at 277.
United States v. Justice, 703 Fed. App’x 345, 346 (5th Cir. 2017).
Id.
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case in their totality.155 The Court upheld the conviction as to videos
containing sexual conduct but vacated the count of one video that did not
involve sexual conduct but was clearly created to appeal to prurient
interests.156
If the drafters of 18 U.S.C. § 48 had previously included a subjective
prurient intent requirement, Justice’s argument would have likely been
preempted before being heard on appeal. This is because the intent behind
the creation of the crush videos in question would likely have satisfied the
above requirement and the Court would not have needed to address whether
the conduct depicted was inherently “sexual” in nature. Whereas the Court’s
favorable interpretation of “obscene” under Miller permitted a more
constitutional reading of the 18 U.S.C. § 48 in Richards, the subsequent
acquittal of Defendant Justice demonstrates the ongoing need for
strengthening the statute before it is challenged once again.

IV. Statutory Overbreadth and the Feasibility of Adding a
Prurience Test to the Scienter Requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 48
As was apparent in United States v. Richards (which challenged the
obscenity of 18 U.S.C. § 48) the issue with statutory specificity still exists
today in the language of the current proposed legislation to refine 18 U.S.C.
§ 48.157 This issue presents a roadblock because no court has provided a tool
for interpreting the statute’s vague “obscene” requirement.
Child
pornography statutes, which contain the same “obscene” language, are won
or lost based on the language of the statute.158 The following section
discusses the background of statutory overbreadth, which is invoked when a
statute impermissibly attempts to regulate obscene speech while incidentally
regulating legal speech. The next section also describes of the purpose of
scienter requirements and how one such requirement may alleviate the
constitutional problems of 18 U.S.C. § 48.

155. Id. at 346–347.
156. Id. at 347.
157. See United States v. Richards, 940 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
158. Brian Verbon Cash, Images of Innocence or Guilt?: The Status of Laws Regulating
Child Pornography on the Federal Level and in Alabama and an Evaluation of the Case
Against Barnes & Noble, 51 ALA. L. REV. 793, 818 (2000).
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A. Statutory Overbreadth and How to Resolve It
The modern overbreadth doctrine permits defendants whose speech is
not constitutionally protected to facially invalidate a statute on behalf of third
parties whose speech may be chilled by the law in question.159 Laws that
regulate substantially more speech than constitutionally prescribed are
considered impermissibly overbroad.160 Historically, the Overbreadth
Doctrine was viewed as either a “last resort” or heavily condemned,161 and
facial overbreadth has not been applied when a limiting construction exists
on the challenged statute.162 Following the Hughes Court (which handed
down Thornhill v. Alabama163) and the “free-speech friendly” Warren Court,
emerged the Burger Court, which adopted more aggressive approach of
invalidating statutes on their face if they overstepped on speech interests.164
The Court in Younger v. Harris restricted any court from enjoining the
enforcement of a statute solely on the basis of a showing that the statute “on
its face” impedes First Amendment rights (absent extraordinary
circumstances), because doing so would contravene the basic functions of
the judicial branch.165 In Younger, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute
for overbreadth, ruling that the statute could not be enforced until the state’s
courts provided a narrowing construction.166
Statutory overbreadth threatens the constitutionality of many criminal
statutes because it presents the risk of criminalizing individuals for legal
conduct. In order to satisfy due process, a statute must be sufficiently definite
in terms of the conduct it is regulating so that a reasonable person
understands what the statute is prohibiting.167 Overbreadth of a statute must
be resolved even before a court can consider whether an underlying crime or
159. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613–15 (1973).
160. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008).
161. See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999).
162. See Williams, 553 U.S. 285, at 293; see also Richards, 940 F. Supp. 2d 548, at 614.
163. See generally Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (the Supreme Court carved
out a protection for peaceful labor picketing speech even though situations where picketers
marched with signs that went beyond the particular labor dispute would be heard again later
by the Court).
164. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863–864
(1991). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. (1971) (“We do not think that opinion stands
for the proposition that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a statute solely on
the basis of a showing that the statute ’on its face’ abridges First Amendment rights.”).
165. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53.
166. Id. at 50–51.
167. Kathryn E. Brown, Stranger than Fiction: Modern Designer Drugs and the Federal
Controlled Substances Analogue Act, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 449, 466 (2015).
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conduct is compelling, which explains why the Court in Stevens spent a
majority of its reasoning on the issue of surface validity but could not address
the constitutional question presented.
The doctrine of overbreadth is applied to laws by one of two
approaches.168 When the government attempts to regulate speech based on
its content, it must address whether the content falls within an already
protected category. The Supreme Court has designated some categories of
speech such as “fighting words” and “obscenity” to be beyond the purview
of First Amendment protection, and the government may regulate or ban
speech within these categories on the basis of content.169 The other approach
is applied to laws that concern speech already fully protected under the First
Amendment. In those cases, even if the speech is harmful the state cannot
regulate it based on content unless there it is necessary to advance a
compelling government interest.170 Alternatively, a court will apply a more
lenient “balancing” test when a regulation is neutral with respect to the
content for the purpose of promoting interests unrelated to the message of
regulated speech.171
Overturning a statute for overbreadth is rare and often a last resort,172
but the Court did so in Stevens because of the numerous hypotheticals
raised.173 By focusing on the hypothetical unconstitutional applications, the
Court never addressed the more important question of whether a law
criminalizing crush videos could be constitutional.174
While the
interpretation of some parts of 18 U.S.C. § 48 were clarified following
Richards and again in Justice, the language of the statute still remains too
broad.
B. The Doctrine and Purpose of “Scienter” Requirements in
Criminal Statutes
This article argues that the addition of a properly tailored scienter
requirement to 18 U.S.C. § 48 would strengthen the goals of the statute’s
purpose and help to accomplish the intent of Congress to prohibit animal
cruelty for valueless entertainment.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Fallon, supra note 161, at 864.
Fallon, supra note 161, at 864.
Fallon, supra note 161, at 864–865.
Fallon, supra note 161, at 865.
LaBahn, supra note 47.
Shafer, supra note 59, at 330.
Shafer, supra note 59, at 325.
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Many criminal statutes include an element of scienter that must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.175 The Supreme Court has determined
the absence of a scienter requirement in an obscenity ordinance “may tend
to work a substantial restriction on the freedom of speech and of the press.”176
This highlights how important it is for certain criminal statutes to articulate
the necessary mens rea to find individuals guilty. Roth v. United States held
that the conduct of the defendant is often of more importance than the
obscenity of the material.177 Later, the Court in Ferber expressly did not
include a scienter requirement in its five-part test, but provided that “criminal
responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on part
of the defendant.”178
The Supreme Court has determined the absence of a scienter
requirement in an obscenity ordinance “may tend to work a substantial
restriction on the freedom of speech and of the press.” This highlights how
important it is for certain criminal statutes to articulate the necessary mens
rea to find individuals guilty.
C. Assessing the Challenges of Including a Subjective “Prurient
Intent” Element in 18 U.S.C. § 48
Recall that the Department of Justice was instructed to narrowly
construe the statute such that only videos of depictions that primarily
appealed to salacious interests should be prosecuted.179 This section argues
that redrafting the statute by manipulating the language of the scienter
requirement further by specifically adding a “prurient intent” element would
allow a Federal Court to more narrowly apply the statute in future cases.
Also recall that the outcome of Stevens largely resulted from the statute
failing to require “cruelty” in addition to requisite intent.180 As discussed
above, even the most recent amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 48 still falls short of
175. Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “scienter” as
“defendant’s previous knowledge of the cause which lead to the injury complained of, or
rather a defendant’s previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard
against and his omission to do which has led to the injury complained of”).
176. Smith v. Cal., 361 U.S. 147, 150.
177. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
178. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982).
179. Kerry Adams, Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty: Unconstitutional or a Valid
Restriction on Speech?, 12 BARRY L. REV. 1, 203, 221 (2009) (noting that “in President
Clinton’s signing statement, he stated that the Justice Department should construe the law
narrowly … [to limit it to] ‘wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest
in sex’”).
180. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (2019).
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defining what makes acts of animal cruelty “obscene.”181 This makes it
incredibly hard for a Court to interpret actual intent without further direction,
and without overstepping into a legislative role. This issue with language
interpretation is common in child pornography cases where, for example, the
state law requires that material be “obscene” but does not define it.182 As a
result, the burden on the prosecution to prove “obscene” is difficult when the
defendant only needs to introduce reasonable doubt as to whether the facts
meet that definition.183
One Alabama case highlights the importance of an appropriately
tailored scienter requirement when a statute involves the criminalization of
“obscene” speech that is ill-defined and potentially criminalizes artistic
expression.184 In 1998, Barnes & Noble was charged for possession of child
pornography contained within two photo books stocked in the store, Radiant
Identities and Age of Innocence. Whereas Ferber established that child
pornography was outside the scope of protection if it involved “scienter” and
depiction of sexual conduct,185 Barnes & Noble argued the images were
protected under the First Amendment for their redeeming artistic value.
However, the Alabama child pornography statute in question (enacted two
years after Ferber) modified the definition of “obscenity” to include
depictions of breast nudity.186 Thus, the Court weighed evidence as to the
intent of the authors behind the images to determine if images of simple
nudity could be considered obscene.187 Even though the case was dismissed,
the questions it raised regarding defining obscenity demonstrate how
difficult it can be for a prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant acted “knowingly,” their visual depictions are considered
“lewd,” and whether those depictions are considered “obscene.”188
Redefining the scienter requirement is essential because the majority in
Stevens emphasized the lack of “prurient” conduct that was actually depicted
181. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (2019); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 462.
182. Cash, supra note 151, at 804–805.
183. See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“Yet our efforts to implement that approach demonstrate that agreement on the
existence of something called ‘obscenity’ is still a long and painful step from agreement on a
workable definition of the term.”).
184. See generally Strickland, 560 F.3d at 446.
185. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758; but cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (Determining what is
“obscene” by means of a three-prong test, which consist of “applying contemporary local
community standards, on the whole, appeals to the prurient interest; is patently offensive; and
on the whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”).
186. Cash, supra note 151, at 818.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 817.
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in crush videos. It is important to note the distinction between depictions of
extreme animal cruelty from the facts of many child pornography cases,
which requires the Court to instead evaluate a visual depiction for
lewdness.189 This distinction between the subject matter of animal cruelty
and human pornography presents the greatest challenge of adding a “prurient
intent” element to the statute’s scienter requirement. Even attempting to
define obscenity in the context of animal cruelty poses a similar challenge
because the Miller standard of obscenity defined above. Recall that Miller
requires not only that the work depicted appeals to prurient interests and
lacks redeeming value, but also that the work depicts sexual conduct.190
Next, it is important to examine case law that concerns the mental state
of the actor to determine if they should be rightfully charged with a crime
under statute. The Supreme Court has more liberally interpreted the meaning
of “lewd or lascivious” in statutes where the language has been challenged
as being “too broad.” Cases after Miller devised a multi-factor test for a trier
of fact to determine if a visual depiction of a nude minor meets the
“lascivious” standard. One such federal case in California, U.S. v. Dost
evaluated the multifactor test and determined that a trier of fact should need
only find that at least one factor is met in order to find that the depiction is
“lascivious.”
Shortly after Dost, the Court in U.S. v. Wiegand shifted the onus from
what was considered sexual conduct from the innocent minor depicted to the
photographer (or videographer). In that case the Court held that
“lasciviousness is not a characteristic of the child photographed but of the
exhibition” and that “[the photograph] was a lascivious exhibition because
the photographer arrayed it to suit his particular lust.”191 Two years later, in
U.S. v. Wolf, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Dost factors and held that there
was no required amount needed to prove sexual exploitation in a
photograph.192 Useful application of the singular final Dost factor which
states “whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual
response in the view” would require a court to acknowledge that the
depiction of crush videos does not contain nudity, but exactly how such a
connection between two types of obscenity should be made is a topic for
future discussion.
If adding a prurient intent element is to improve the success of 18
U.S.C. § 48, a court must interpret a defendant-actor’s intent. In 2000, a
189. See generally United States v. Nemuras, 567 F. Supp. 87 (D. Md. 1983) (the court
had to determine whether certain photographs constituted a “lewd exhibition of the genitals”).
190. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
191. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987).
192. United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 246 (10th Cir. 1989).
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New Jersey court convicted defendants of throwing away a barrel of
chickens that inadvertently contained some still alive in State of New Jersey
v. ISE Farms, Inc.193 On appeal, the Superior Court overturned the judgment
on the basis that the defendants did not violate the law “knowingly,” stating
that the New Jersey statute did not sufficiently state the requisite mental
state.194 Unlike the lower court’s reasoning, the Superior Court’s analysis of
the statute highlighted the lacking intent of the defendants. Where the
negligence of the defendant did not equate to recklessness, the defendants
could not be held liable for animal cruelty.195
D. Proving How Adding an Enhanced “Prurient Intent”
Requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 48 Would Make It Constitutionally
Stronger
In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, the Supreme Court considered whether
the language of “prurient interest” passed overbreadth.196 In that case, a
Washington moral nuisance statute attempted to prohibit material
specifically “appealing to a prurient interest,” which was defined as “inciting
lasciviousness or lust.”197 The Ninth Circuit in that case viewed the entire
statute as overbroad because the definition encompassed “lust,” or a normal
interest in sex. The Court condemned complete invalidity and was satisfied
that statute was constitutional except to the extent that the statute punished
legal conduct.198 The Court in its reasoning referred to the definition of
prurient interest devised in Roth v. United States where “prurient interest”
may be constitutionally defined for obscenity purposes as that which appeals
to a shameful or morbid interest in sex.199 Essentially, if language that
defines “prurient interest” was to be added to an amended version of 18
U.S.C. § 48 the Supreme Court would be unable to strike down the entirety
of the statute on that basis as it did in Stevens.

193. State of New Jersey v. ISE Farms, Inc. Transcript of Sup. Ct. Warren Co., (Mar. 8,
2001).
194. State of New Jersey v. ISE Farms, Inc., Appeal No. A-45-00 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Law Div.
Mar. 8, 2001); see also David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House:
Animals, Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN AND
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, EDS., ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 205,
207–208 (Oxford 2004).
195. Id.
196. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491.
197. Id. (citing Missouri v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079 (1954)).
198. Id. at 504–505.
199. Id. at 505.
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As mentioned in Section C, simply adding statutory exceptions in a
statute or requesting the Court limit application of a statute after-the-fact may
not dissuade a particularly adamant individual from finding novel ways to
work around the statute’s exceptions to find legal loopholes by classifying
their depiction under “hunting” or “educational purposes.” This means that,
in another example, if someone pays workers in factory farms to film the
crushing of animals considered to be a common practice exemption to
cruelty, the act of selling those depictions later could be exempt from the
current statute because doing so would easily fall under an exception. For
this reason, an enhanced scienter requirement could make it easier for
prosecutors to determine if appropriate level of mental state to find conduct
liable as animal cruelty. Another example of this could be adding language
that highlights conduct must be taken as a whole to meet a “prurient interest”
test in order for it to satisfy the “obscene” element of 18 U.S.C. § 48
(f)(2)(B).
If a “prurient intent” scienter requirement based on standards similar to
child pornography case law discussed above is added, it would require a trier
of fact to apply a “totality of circumstances” approach to infer the intent of
the producer.200 This “totality of the circumstances” approach would also
function better than a standard scienter element because it would require the
use of circumstantial evidence to better assess whether the purpose of
recording an intentional killing was done to inflict pain for prurient
gratification to serve a justifiable legal means.
One strong example of a criminal statute with such a “prurient intent”
element is Maryland Criminal Law Code § 3-902, which prohibits the “video
surveillance of another in a private place with a prurient intent” and requires
the State to satisfy the burden of proof by providing circumstantial evidence
of such intent.201 The statute clarifies that video surveillance done
intentionally but without a prurient intent is only actionable under tort law
as an unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion.202 In this case, the prurient
intent was demonstrated in the form of admissible evidence surrounding the
crime such as prior similar acts and internet search history. This was seen in
Bickford v. State, where the Court admitted evidence of a defendant’s
Internet history that was probative of prurient intent despite the defendant’s
objection that such evidence was highly prejudicial.203

200. Id.
201. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-902.
202. Id.
203. Bickford v. State, No. 95, 2018 Md. App. LEXIS 471, at 23 (App. May 15, 2018). See
also State v. Kula, 908 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“[t]he State appears to have
carefully restricted its evidence so as to offer only that information necessary to prove […]
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In order to charge a defendant for a crime that requires knowledge of
intent, it is germane to closely scrutinize circumstantial evidence related to
the motive of the depicter of animal crush videos.204 Proper use of
circumstantial evidence is important in child pornography cases where a
possessor or depicter of material may lack the same prurient intent as another
individual who would use it for their sexual gratification. Measuring the
subjective prurient intent of a defendant is similarly important as applied to
anti-animal cruelty depictions because a depicter may not be motivated to
sell their depiction to others for sexual titillation purposes.205 The Supreme
Court has held the government is not required to present expert testimony to
prove obscenity,206 but the Second Circuit in United States v. Petrov clarified
that in instances where the sexual nature of the obscene material is not
immediately apparent, expert testimony may be used to show how the
material appeals to the prurient interests of deviant segments of society.207
Petrov established that the government must identify the deviant group, it
must establish that the material appeals to the group’s prurient interests.208
This was similarly at issue in United States v. Ragsdale where the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the government did not need to prove
that a jury was qualified to determine if videotapes sold by defendants
offended local standards.209 The reasoning by the court in Ragsdale
demonstrates that a government proving the guilt an individual found
violating 18 U.S.C.§ 48 for depicting animal crush videos would not need
the use of expert testimony, making the case for prosecution easier.
The following statute contains a “prurient intent” element as one
example legislators may take into consideration in revising 18 U.S.C. § 48.
Maryland Criminal Law Code § 3-902 criminalizes “video surveillance of
another in a private place with a prurient intent” and requires the State to
provide evidence of such intent.210 The statute clarifies that video
surveillance done intentionally but without a prurient intent is only
that he did these acts intentionally rather than accidentally, and that he acted with the intent
to satisfy his own sexual desires or those of another”).
204. See Commonwealth v. Davidson, 595 Pa. 1, 43 (2007).
205. Id.
206. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
207. See United States v. Petrov, 747 F.2d 824, 830 (2d Cir. 1984).
208. Id.
209. See United States v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 785 (5th Cir. 2005).
210. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-902; see also State v. Kula, 908 N.W.2d 539
(Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“The State appears to have carefully restricted its evidence so as to
offer only that information necessary to prove […] that he did these acts intentionally rather
than accidentally, and that he acted with the intent to satisfy his own sexual desires or those
of another.”).
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actionable under tort law as an unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion.211
The statute provides the criminal scope of the statute is limited only to
individuals with prurient intent.212 Such an element of prurient intent could
be adapted under the section (b) “Extraterritorial application” of 18 U.S.C. §
48 section (b) to read:
( 1 ) Creation of animal crush videos.
“–It shall be unlawful for any person, with [prurient intent],
to knowingly create or procure any depiction of animal crushing
featuring the infliction of bodily injury, death, or torture on an
animal.”
(1)…
[( A ) The person engaging in such conduct intends or has
reason to know that the animal crush video will derive sexual
pleasure or gratification from inflicting death, bodily injury, or
physical pain on another person.]213
or, similarly, within section (f) “Definitions” as:
(4) “Prurient Intent” is defined as the intent to arouse,
appeal to, or gratify the sexual desire of any person.214
Therefore, the central argument of this article posits that implementing
a prurient intent requirement into 18 U.S.C. § 48 would provide the federal
government with interpretation tools necessary to differentiate between
depictions of animals in pain made with the deliberate intent to cause
unwarranted suffering without intrinsic purpose. Using already-existing
statutes for reference, as shown above, the value of inserting a specific
prurient intent element would make it much clearer for courts to understand
how to interpret the intent of an individual. Thus, targeting specific conduct
that “appealing to sexual interests” through an enhanced scienter

211. Id.
212. See Harleysville Preferred Ins. Co. v. Rams Head Savage Mill, LLC, 237 Md. App.
705.
213. See Cal. Evid. Code §1108 (defining “sexual offense” as “[d]eriving sexual pleasure
or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person).
214. Cf. 18 U.S.C.S. § 920(g)(2) (”sexual contact” defined as “touching … with an intent
to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person …”).

4 - Radford_HJCP_V1-2

Summer 2020]

5/13/2020 11:38 AM

United States v. Stevens at 10

257

requirement would work to eliminate the chance of wrongfully convicting
individuals for their depictions.
Enhancing the statutory framework of 18 U.S.C. § 48 has the potential
to overcome some of the First Amendment challenges seen in Stevens,
Richards, and Justice. The above sections have demonstrated the use of
scienter requirements in criminal statutes as one means to resolve the First
Amendment challenges seen in those three cases. Finally, other criminal
statutes have demonstrated how a prurient intent element would be used to
resolve the statutory overbreadth problem to be more precisely prosecute
individuals who continue to participate in the production of animal crush
videos.

V. Substituting Incarceration with Non-Penal, Therapeutic
Solutions for Offenders of 18 U.S.C. § 48 and Beyond
Rehabilitation functions as one of four goals (along with retribution,
deterrence, and incapacitation) historically viewed by criminal scholars as
justification for imposing criminal sentences. Rehabilitation, put plainly,
seeks to modify offender’s behavior so they will not continue to commit
crime in the future.215 Until the final quarter of the twentieth century, the
rehabilitative model of sentencing was viewed as the primary means to
justify incarceration.216 By the 1980s, rehabilitation had been abandoned for
a punishment-driven approach to sentencing that replaced the rehabilitation
model in most jurisdictions.217
It is undeniable that efforts to rehabilitate offenders of 18 U.S.C. § 48,
or any animal abuse statute for that matter, have been largely secondary to
the aggressive prosecution tactics aimed at targeting animal abusers. Today,
there is growing consensus that the outcomes of strict prosecution of those
guilty of animal abuse is misleading and overstated.218 An increasing
number of animal rights advocates are criticizing the role of incarceration as
“not the unmitigated good for society” that it was thought to be a generation
ago.219 For example, the litigation approach used to target animal abuse in
factory farms has resulted in overwhelmingly prosecuting low-income,
people of color, many of whom are deported because of uncertain
215. DORIS L. MACKENZIE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE 1 (2000).
216. Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of a “Tough
on Crime” Philosophy, 93 KY. L.J. 305, 312 (2005).
217. Id. at 316.
218. JUSTIN MARCEAU, BEYOND CAGES: ANIMAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT (2019).
219. Id. at 255.
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immigration status.220 Again others in the animal protection movement
argue that criminal intervention is necessary to prosecute harshly to put an
animal abuser on the radar of law enforcement and prevent future
violence.221 In reality, there is little data to support the notion that
convictions alone are sufficient interventions for protecting animals and even
humans from future harm.222 Further, while there exist animal cruelty laws
in all fifty states, there has been no push to implement mandatory treatment
or reporting, which does not exist in a single state.223 An emerging body of
research in effective counseling and interventions for animal cruelty includes
treatment plans that include animal-assisted therapy to provide a way for an
animal abuser to reintegrate into society and develop empathy.224 Given that
psychologists have recognized many offenders of wanton animal abuse
suffer from psychological disorders, penalizing an individual by locking
them away in jail acts as a denial of treatment and imposes additional
stressors.
Regardless of how 18 U.S.C. § 48 is interpreted in the future, courts
will need to recognize that the appropriate treatment of offenders is far more
important than incarceration, which tends to increase future criminality.
While punishment retains some embodiment of a necessary evil, increasing
incarceration is unlikely to ensure the protection of animals and mental
health of their human counterparts.225 Current legislation that heightens an
animal abuse crime from a misdemeanor to a felony increasing the number
of incarcerable years will accomplish little without data-based treatment
procedures that are uniformly and consistently applied. Future scholarship
on this issue must focus on not only how to better identify actual animal
abusers, as much of this Article does, but also how courts can better
implement mandatory and practical treatment instead of mandatory prison
terms to circumvent the underlying abusive behavior.

220. Id. at 251.
221. Id. at 256.
222. Id. at 257.
223. Id. at 247.
224. Id. at 246, (citing Llian Alys et al., Developmental Animal Cruelty and Its Correlates
in Sexual Homicide Offenders and Sex Offenders, in THE LINK BETWEEN ANIMAL VIOLENCE
AND HUMAN VIOLENCE (Andrew Linzey ed. 2009)).
225. MARCEAU, supra at note 208, at 283.
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VI. Conclusion
A growing body of research indicates the psychological harm suffered
by those who engage in wanton animal cruelty for the purposes of causing
pain.226 Such research has shown that legitimizing the access to video
depictions by nonenforcement is likely to lead vulnerable individuals to
commit acts of criminal cruelty.227 As stated above, this warrants further
legislative action into finding novel treatments courts can impose on or those
who produce animal crush content to avoid future recidivism and
overcriminalization.
There is also an undeniably compelling need to address the profiting
aspect of committing untraceable illegal acts of animal cruelty. If regulating
the trade of crush videos cannot be regulated as commercial speech,
legislators must work diligently to add an enhanced prurience-based scienter
requirement which will preempt any attempts at veiling conduct as having
any entertainment value, such as hunting or documentary.
Anti-animal cruelty legislation seeks to prevent the deliberate or willful
mistreatment of animals by imposing criminal sanctions for jeopardizing
animal welfare.228 Criminalizing any depiction of blatant animal abuse is a
necessity to uphold nonhuman animal rights. As the article has discussed,
doing so is easier said than done. Case law emerging from 18 U.S.C. § 48
has been unfavorable in preventing depictions of animal cruelty because
Section 48 has proven to be constitutionally weak, and thus subject to
invalidation. One course of action around the Court’s reluctance to create
new categories of unprotected speech in this area would be the addition of a
“prurient intent” element to the statute.
Therefore, until the Court recognizes depictions of animal abuse as a
novel unprotected category of speech, purveyors of animal crush videos will
continue to make legal profits at the expense of animal lives. This article has
argued one workable solution, which is that 18 U.S.C. § 48 must be finely
tuned elsewhere—likely with a prurient intent element that targets the mens
rea of the offender. Such an element presents a less restrictive, contentneutral option than wholly banning distributing depictions of wanton animal
cruelty.

226. Meredith Shafer, Perplexing Precedent: United States v. Stevens Confounds a
Century of Supreme Court Conventionalism and Redefines the Limits of “Entertainment”, 19
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 286–287 (2012).
227. Michael Reynolds, Note, Depictions of the Pig Roast: Restricting Violent Speech
Without Burning the House, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 341, 343 (2009).
228. Jessica Vapnek and Megan Chapman, Legislative and regulatory options for animal
welfare, FAO LEGISLATIVE STUDY, 2011, http://www.fao.org/3/i1907e/i1907e00.pdf.
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It is imperative that the legislature addresses the constitutional
weaknesses of 18 U.S.C. § 48 and attempts to draft a more precise version.
The longer the statute takes to be redrafted, the more likely offenders will
continue heinous acts of depicting abuse and escape prosecution. Until then,
animal crushing for broadcast entertainment will remain legal.229 As the
nether corners of the Internet continue to elude the purview of state law,
federal statutory enforcement must step up and restrict depictions for sexual
or gratification purposes.

229. Networks such as the Discovery Channel are notorious for broadcasting the killing
and crushing of animals for airing on survival shows such as “Man vs. Wild.” Michael
Mountain, Discovery Channel’s Crush Videos, ALL CREATURES (Oct. 2010), https://www.allcreatures.org/articles/ar-channel.html.

